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CONSTITUTIONAL SECRECY:  
ALIGNING NATIONAL SECURITY LETTER 
NONDISCLOSURE PROVISIONS WITH FIRST 
AMENDMENT RIGHTS 
BRIAN D. EYINK† 
ABSTRACT 
  First created in the 1980s, national security letters and their 
nondisclosure provisions evaded judicial review until 2004. These 
secretive investigative tools allow federal agencies such as the FBI to 
compel disclosure of information about hundreds of thousands of 
people while also allowing the same agencies to unilaterally issue gag 
orders that can silence the people who receive these letters. This Note 
examines the nondisclosure provisions in the national security letter 
statutes. It argues that the nondisclosure provisions are 
unconstitutional prior restraints on speech and content-based speech 
restrictions. This Note then proposes a three-part solution that 
constitutionally balances the government’s need to protect national 
security with its citizens’ rights to freedom of speech. 
INTRODUCTION 
  Three years ago, I received a national security letter (NSL) in my 
capacity as the president of a small Internet access and consulting 
business. The letter ordered me to provide sensitive information 
about one of my clients. There was no indication that a judge had 
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reviewed or approved the letter, and it turned out that none had. 
The letter came with a gag provision that prohibited me from telling 
anyone, including my client, that the FBI was seeking this 
information. Based on the context of the demand — a context that 
the FBI still won’t let me discuss publicly — I suspected that the FBI 
was abusing its power and that the letter sought information to 
which the FBI was not entitled. 
  . . . .  
  Living under the gag order has been stressful and surreal. Under 
the threat of criminal prosecution, I must hide all aspects of my 
involvement in the case — including the mere fact that I received an 
NSL — from my colleagues, my family and my friends. When I meet 
with my attorneys I cannot tell my girlfriend where I am going or 
where I have been. I hide any papers related to the case in a place 
where she will not look. When clients and friends ask me whether I 
am the one challenging the constitutionality of the NSL statute, I 
have no choice but to look them in the eye and lie.1 
Each year, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) secretly 
sends tens of thousands of national security letters (NSLs) to 
communication providers and financial institutions requiring them to 
turn over customer records and admonishing them not to reveal that 
anything happened.2 These letters have existed in one form or 
another since the 1980s, but the Patriot Act expanded their reach, 
made them easier to obtain, and turned them into one of the FBI’s 
favorite investigative tools.3 The anonymous NSL recipient who 
recounted the story above is far from alone—the FBI issued more 
 
 1. Anonymous, My National Security Letter Gag Order, WASH. POST, Mar. 23, 2007, at 
A17. 
 2. See OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, A REVIEW OF THE 
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION’S USE OF NATIONAL SECURITY LETTERS 120 (2007) 
[hereinafter OIG REPORT], available at http://www.usdoj.gov/oig/special/s0703b/final.pdf 
(“After the Patriot Act, the number of NSL requests increased to approximately 39,000 in 2003, 
approximately 56,000 in 2004, and approximately 47,000 in 2005.”). 
 3. See CHARLES DOYLE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., NATIONAL SECURITY LETTERS IN 
FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE INVESTIGATIONS: LEGAL BACKGROUND AND RECENT 
AMENDMENTS 5 (2007), available at http://fas.org/sgp/crs/intel/RL33320.pdf (“The [Patriot Act] 
amendments allowed NSL authority to be employed more quickly (without the delays 
associated with prior approval from FBI headquarters) and more widely (without requiring that 
the information pertain to a foreign power or its agents).”). 
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than 143,000 NSL requests between 2003 and 2005.4 By 2005, the FBI 
was using NSLs in approximately 29 percent of its counterterrorism 
investigations.5 NSLs are issued to individuals, not just businesses; 
thousands of American citizens have thus suffered the same fear and 
uncertainty as the anonymous writer. Moreover, they cannot even 
discuss NSLs with the American public.  
NSL statutes have become quite controversial and raise 
numerous First and Fourth Amendment concerns.6 Critics claim that 
these provisions violate privacy and autonomy, that the gag orders 
are unconstitutional restraints on speech, and that the judicial review 
mechanism unconstitutionally dictates a lower standard of review 
than the First Amendment requires.7 Scholarship on NSLs has tended 
to either focus on Fourth Amendment search-and-seizure concerns8 
or address NSLs as part of a broader critique of the nation’s 
counterterrorism and foreign-intelligence programs.9 Although these 
 
 4. OIG REPORT, supra note 2, at 120. 
 5. Id. 
 6. See Zachary D. Shankman, Note, Devising a Constitutional National Security Letter 
Process in Light of Doe v. Ashcroft, 94 GEO. L.J. 247, 251 (2005) (“[T]he contentious provisions 
of the Act involve broad investigative powers, veiled in secrecy, accorded to the government in 
the name of national security. Arguably, the broadest of these powers is the National Security 
Letter.”); id. at 256 (“[T]hese Fourth and First Amendment concerns provide the foundation for 
striking down [an NSL provision] . . . .”). 
 7. E.g., ANN BEESON & JAMEEL JAFFER, AM. CIV. LIBERTIES UNION, UNPATRIOTIC 
ACTS: THE FBI’S POWER TO RIFLE THROUGH YOUR RECORDS AND PERSONAL BELONGINGS 
WITHOUT TELLING YOU 7 (2003), available at http://www.aclu.org/FilesPDFs/spies_report.pdf 
(“[NSLs] violate[] privacy and due process rights guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment, and 
free speech rights guaranteed by the First Amendment.”); Nathan Alexander Sales, Secrecy and 
National Security Investigations, 58 ALA. L. REV. 811, 813 (2007) (“Academics and advocates 
alike have denounced these [NSL] secrecy rules as poor public policy, not to mention affronts to 
various constitutional guarantees.”); Shankman, supra note 6, at 259 (“Not only does the NSL 
process implicate a subscriber’s right to privacy, free speech, and anonymous association, but it 
also affects the recipient’s First Amendment rights. The categorical and indefinite disclosure ban 
is not narrowly tailored to serve the government’s interests, and it causes an undue burden on 
service providers.”). 
 8. See, e.g., Susan N. Herman, The USA PATRIOT Act and the Submajoritarian Fourth 
Amendment, 41 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 67, 86–92 (2006) (describing the evolution of NSLs 
and their Fourth Amendment implications); Lauren M. Weiner, Comment, “Special” Delivery: 
Where Do National Security Letters Fit into the Fourth Amendment?, 33 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 
1453, 1469–75 (2006) (arguing that NSLs violate the Fourth Amendment in a number of ways). 
 9. See, e.g., Laura K. Donohue, Anglo-American Privacy and Surveillance, 96 J. CRIM. L. 
& CRIMINOLOGY 1059, 1108–18 (2006) (describing the evolution of NSLs, but in the broader 
context of Anglo-American security law); Paul M. Schwartz, Reviving Telecommunications 
Surveillance Law, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 287, 301–05 (2008) (discussing the government’s reporting 
EYINK IN FINAL[1].DOC 11/16/2008  10:05:58 PM 
476 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 58:473 
 
criticisms deserve lively debate, scholars have not yet carefully 
scrutinized the First Amendment concerns that NSLs’ troubling 
nondisclosure provisions raise. Scholars evaluating NSLs have thus 
not found an appropriate balance between the government’s secrecy 
interest and citizens’ First Amendment rights. 
This Note examines NSL nondisclosure provisions in light of 
First Amendment guarantees and concludes that the provisions are 
unconstitutional prior restraints and content-based restrictions on 
speech. Part I discusses the use and structure of the various NSL 
provisions. Part II applies established First Amendment law to the 
NSL nondisclosure provisions and identifies three significant 
constitutional shortcomings: First, the nondisclosure provisions 
restrain speech without providing the proper procedural safeguards to 
ensure prompt and fair judicial review. Second, the provisions vest 
too much discretion with the issuing authority, which risks 
inconsistent and arbitrary application of the nondisclosure provisions. 
Third, the provisions authorize gag orders that are not narrowly 
tailored to protecting national security. 
Part III proposes a three-part solution that balances national 
security needs against First Amendment rights to create 
constitutionally valid NSL nondisclosure provisions. First, the issuing 
authority should be permitted to issue a temporary gag order that will 
expire unless the issuer goes to court and seeks judicial authorization. 
Second, the issuing authority should be required to possess specific 
and articulable facts that give reason to believe that disclosure of the 
NSL would endanger national security. Third, gag orders should be 
tailored to prohibit only disclosure of NSL-related information that 
would actually endanger national security. 
I.  USE AND STRUCTURE OF NSLS 
National security letters are one of several information-gathering 
tools available to federal officials conducting national security 
investigations.10 Functioning similarly to administrative subpoenas, 
 
obligations regarding NSLs in the broader context of reporting and disclosure obligations for all 
electronic surveillance laws). 
 10. See Sales, supra note 7, at 849 (“Section 215 is not the only tool the Executive Branch 
may use to obtain documentary information in national security investigations. In addition, 
there [are] . . . ‘National Security Letter,’ or ‘NSL,’ statutes.”). The Foreign Intelligence 
Surveillance Act of 1978 (FISA), 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801–71 (2000 & Supp. V 2005), for example, 
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NSLs allow investigators to secretly gather preliminary information 
about the target of an investigation.11 Although NSLs have existed in 
one form or another since the 1980s, the Patriot Act greatly expanded 
their scope and relaxed the standards by which they are issued.12 
Given these factors and the government’s growing focus on 
counterterrorism investigations,13 the use of NSLs has dramatically 
increased since the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks. In 2000, the 
FBI issued about 8,500 NSL requests.14 By 2003, that number 
skyrocketed to 39,000 requests, and then jumped to 56,000 requests in 
2004 and to 74,000 requests in 2005.15 
 
authorizes wiretaps, id. § 1802, and physical searches, id. § 1822, in national security 
investigations. 
 11. See DOYLE, supra note 3, at 1 (“A National Security Letter (NSL) seeks customer and 
consumer transaction information in national security investigations from communications 
providers, financial institutions and credit agencies.”). 
 12. See Brett A. Shumate, Comment, Thou Shalt Not Speak: The Nondisclosure Provisions 
of the National Security Letter Statutes and the First Amendment Challenge, 41 GONZ. L. REV. 
151, 157 (2005) (“First, the [Patriot] Act extended the use of NSLs beyond foreign counter-
intelligence cases to include international terrorism cases. Second, the Act relaxed the standard 
by which an NSL may be issued.”). 
 13. Memorandum from the Gen. Counsel, FBI Nat’l Sec. Law Unit, to All Field Offices 2–
3 (Nov. 28, 2001), available at http://www.aclu.org/patriot_foia/FOIA/Nov2001FBImemo.pdf 
(“Given the new statutory language, the OGC and DOJ have taken the position that NSLs also 
may be authorized in foreign counterintelligence (FCI) and international terrorism (IT) 
preliminary inquiries . . . . The USA PATRIOT Act greatly broadened the FBI’s authority to 
gather this [NSL] information.”). 
 14. OIG REPORT, supra note 2, at xvi. One NSL can contain multiple requests, so the total 
number of requests exceeds the total number of NSLs issued. See id. at 120 (“[O]ne national 
security letter may contain more than one request for information.”). 
 15. Id. at xvi. These numbers are likely low. In its report, the OIG discovered that in a 
sample of NSLs, 17 percent of letters and 22 percent of requests went unreported, leading it to 
conclude that “we believe that the total number of NSLs and NSL requests issued by the FBI 
are significantly higher than the FBI reported.” Id. at 121. 
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NSL provisions authorize an investigating authority16 to compel a 
recipient to disclose certain documents for national security 
investigations. Further, they prohibit the recipient from discussing the 
existence of the NSL.17 Typically, the investigating authority issues an 
NSL to an electronic-communications service provider18 or a financial 
or consumer-credit institution and requests records containing 
various forms of personal information.19 Most importantly to the 
interest of secrecy, the investigating authority has the discretion to 
issue a gag order prohibiting the third party from disclosing the 
existence of the NSL.20 Section A briefly describes the evolution of 
NSLs from a single narrow exception to a set of widely used 
investigative tools. Section B describes the troubling nondisclosure 
provision common to all NSLs. 
A. The Evolution of the National Security Letter 
Congress created the first NSL as an exception to the privacy 
guarantees recognized by the Right to Financial Privacy Act of 1978 
(RFPA).21 This new exception allowed a governmental authority to 
 
 16. This Note uses the FBI to represent all investigating authorities with the power to issue 
NSLs. The only significant report on NSL use, by the Office of the Inspector General (OIG), 
focused solely on the FBI’s use of the letters: 
In the Patriot Reauthorization Act, enacted in 2006, Congress directed the 
Department of Justice (Department) Office of the Inspector General (OIG) to 
review “the effectiveness and use, including any improper or illegal use, of national 
security letters issued by the Department of Justice.” . . . This report describes the 
results of the first OIG review of the FBI’s use of national security letters (NSLs), 
covering calendar years (CY) 2003 through 2005. 
Id. at 1 (quoting USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 
109-177, § 119(a), 120 Stat. 192, 219 (2006)). Additionally, all of the NSL statutes vest NSL 
authority with the FBI. Therefore, this Note often refers to the FBI as the issuing authority for 
NSLs, but other authorities explicitly do have NSL authority. For more information about each 
of the five NSL statutes, including the agencies they cover, see infra note 31. For the purposes of 
this Note, the terms “FBI,” “issuing authority,” and “investigating authority” all refer to the 
government entity issuing the NSL. 
 17. Sales, supra note 7, at 849–50. 
 18. An electronic communication service is “any service which provides to users thereof 
the ability to send or receive wire or electronic communications.” 18 U.S.C. § 2510(15) (2006). 
 19. Sales, supra note 7, at 849–50. The institution affected and the information available 
depends on what type of NSL is being issued. For more information about each NSL provision, 
see infra note 31. 
 20. See Andrew E. Nieland, Note, National Security Letters and the Amended Patriot Act, 
92 CORNELL L. REV. 1201, 1205 (2007) (“[T]he FBI may still ‘gag’ recipients indefinitely . . . .”). 
 21. Right to Financial Privacy Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-630, tit. XI, § 1114, 92 Stat. 3697, 
3707 (1986) (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 3414 (2006)); DOYLE, supra note 3, at 2 
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request disclosure of protected financial records for national security 
related investigations.22 The original provision merely permitted 
rather than compelled financial institutions to disclose records, so 
some financial institutions refused to comply with governmental 
requests.23 To make the nascent NSL provision more effective,24 
Congress amended the RFPA to require disclosure when the FBI had 
“specific and articulable facts giving reason to believe that the 
customer or entity whose records are sought is a foreign power or an 
agent of a foreign power.”25 In the same session, Congress passed the 
Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986 (ECPA), which 
included a provision requiring communication providers to disclose 
certain customer identification and transactional records to the FBI 
for use in “foreign counterintelligence investigations.”26 These two 
NSL statutes contain nondisclosure provisions prohibiting the 
recipient from acknowledging the existence of the NSL.27 Congress 
again added two additional NSL provisions in the 1990s,28 and the 
Patriot Act added a fifth NSL provision and expanded three of the 
existing NSL provisions in 2001.29 Thus, in less than two decades, 
 
(referring to the initial RFPA exception and noting, “the exception was just that, an 
exception”). 
 22. 12 U.S.C. § 3414(a)(1). 
 23. DOYLE, supra note 3, at 2. Financial institutions in states with strong banking-privacy 
statutes or constitutional privacy laws often refused to comply to avoid violating those state 
laws. H.R. REP. NO. 99-690, at 15–16 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5341, 5341–42. 
 24. DOYLE, supra note 3, at 2–3. 
 25. Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1987, Pub. L. No. 99-569, § 404, 100 Stat. 
3190, 3197 (1986) (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 3414(a)(5) (2006)). As of 2008, the 
records must be “sought for foreign counter intelligence purposes to protect against 
international terrorism or clandestine intelligence activities.” 12 U.S.C. § 3414(a)(5)(A). 
 26. Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-508, § 201, 100 Stat. 
1848, 1867 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 2709 (2006)). 
 27. Right to Financial Privacy Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-630, tit. XI, § 1114(a)(3), 92 Stat. 
3641, 3708 (1986) (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 3414(a)(3) (2006)); Electronic 
Communications Privacy Act of 1986 § 201, 100 Stat. at 1867 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. 
§ 2709(c)(1) (2006)). 
 28. DOYLE, supra note 3, at 3. Congress added NSL authority to the National Security Act 
in 1994, Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1995, Pub. L. No. 103-359, § 802(a), 108 
Stat. 3423, 3436–37 (1994) (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. § 436 (2000)), and to the Fair 
Credit Reporting Act in 1995, Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1996, Pub. L. No. 
104-93, § 601(a), 109 Stat. 961, 974–77 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 1681u (2006)). 
 29. DOYLE, supra note 3, at 4–6. Congress added an additional NSL provision to the Fair 
Credit Reporting Act in 2001. International Money Laundering Abatement and Financial Anti-
Terrorism Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, tit. III, § 358(g), 115 Stat. 294, 327–28 (codified as 
amended at 15 U.S.C. § 1681v (2006)). Notably, the Patriot Act expanded NSL authority by 
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NSLs evolved from a single, noncompulsory exception to the RFPA 
into full-fledged, codified investigative tools that allowed the FBI 
access to customers’ financial and communication records.30 
The five NSL provisions function similarly but allow different 
investigative authorities to obtain different types of records from 
different organizations.31 All five NSL statutes have similar 
nondisclosure provisions that appear to completely prohibit the 
 
giving special agents in charge at FBI field offices authority to issue NSLs, whereas previously 
only officials at FBI headquarters had such authority. DOYLE, supra note 3, at 4. It also 
expanded the scope of NSLs to cover investigations of international terrorism in addition to 
foreign intelligence operations. Id. 
 30. See DOYLE, supra note 3, at 2–3 (detailing the history of Congress’s expanded 
implementation of NSLs). 
 31. For a detailed explanation of the five NSL statutes, see generally DOYLE, supra note 3. 
Briefly, the five NSLs operate as follows: 
 The Right to Financial Privacy Act NSL allows the FBI to compel a financial institution 
to produce certain financial records. 12 U.S.C. § 3414(a)(5)(A). 
 The Electronic Communications Privacy Act NSL allows the FBI to compel a “wire or 
electronic communication service provider” to disclose “subscriber information and toll billing 
records information, or electronic communication transactional records.” 18 U.S.C. § 2709(a). 
Specifically, the FBI can “request the name, address, length of service, and local and long 
distance toll billing records of a person or entity.” Id. § 2709(b)(1). 
 The National Security Act NSL is a rather limited NSL provision that allows an 
“authorized investigative agency” to request “financial records, other financial information, and 
consumer reports” to investigate a federal Executive branch employee. 50 U.S.C. § 436(a). 
Congress added this NSL provision to facilitate investigations of leaked classified information 
following the Aldrich Ames spy scandal. OIG REPORT, supra note 2, at xiv. Ames, a CIA 
double agent, spied for the Soviet Union and then Russia for nearly nine years and pocketed 
more than $2.5 million in the process. David Johnston, How the F.B.I. Finally Caught Aldrich 
Ames, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 27, 1995, at A18. 
 The § 1681u NSL is part of the Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681–81x 
(2006), and gets its name to distinguish it from another NSL included in the Fair Credit 
Reporting Act. The §1681u NSL requires a consumer reporting agency to provide the FBI with 
“the names and addresses of all financial institutions . . . at which a consumer maintains or has 
maintained an account,” id. § 1681u(a), as well as “identifying information respecting a 
consumer, limited to name, addresses, former address, places of employment, or former places 
of employment,” id. § 1681u(b). 
 The § 1681v NSL was added to the Fair Credit Reporting Act by the Patriot Act in 
2001. International Money Laundering Abatement and Financial Anti-Terrorism Act of 2001 
§ 358(g), 115 Stat. at 327–28. The § 1681v NSL requires a consumer reporting agency to disclose 
a requested consumer report and all other information in a person’s file if the information is 
necessary to an international terrorism investigation. 15 U.S.C. § 1681v(a). This NSL differs 
from the others in that it applies broadly to any governmental agency, not just the FBI, it 
applies only to international terrorism investigations, not clandestine counterintelligence 
operations, and the information must be necessary, not just relevant, to the investigation. Sales, 
supra note 7, at 850–51. 
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recipient from disclosing the existence of an NSL.32 Following two 
federal court challenges to the constitutionality of the NSL 
nondisclosure provisions,33 Congress amended the NSL provisions in 
2006 to permit the recipient of an NSL to disclose the existence of the 
request to a person necessary to comply with the request or to an 
attorney34 and to challenge the gag order in court.35 
B. The National Security Letter Nondisclosure Provisions 
Although the five NSL statutes apply to different situations, their 
nondisclosure provisions are “substantively indistinguishable.”36 The 
Electronic Communications Privacy Act NSL’s nondisclosure 
provision is characteristic of the five NSLs. It reads, 
If the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, or his 
designee in a position not lower than Deputy Assistant Director at 
Bureau headquarters or a Special Agent in Charge in a Bureau field 
office designated by the Director, certifies that otherwise there may 
result a danger to the national security of the United States, 
interference with a criminal, counterterrorism, or 
counterintelligence investigation, interference with diplomatic 
relations, or danger to the life or physical safety of any person, no 
wire or electronic communications service provider, or officer, 
employee, or agent thereof, shall disclose to any person (other than 
those to whom such disclosure is necessary to comply with the 
request or an attorney to obtain legal advice or legal assistance with 
respect to the request) that the Federal Bureau of Investigation has 
sought or obtained access to information or records under this 
section.37 
This provision contains several features that give the FBI substantial 
leeway to impose gag orders. First, the gag orders are self-certifying; 
 
 32. DOYLE, supra note 3, at 12; see also, e.g., 12 U.S.C. § 3414(a)(3)(A) (“[N]o financial 
institution . . . shall disclose to any person . . . that the Government authority . . . has sought or 
obtained access to a customer’s financial records.”). 
 33. See infra note 52. 
 34. USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-177,  
§ 116, 120 Stat. 192, 213–17 (2006) (codified in scattered sections of 12, 15, 18 U.S.C. and to be 
codified in 50 U.S.C. § 436(b)). 
 35. Id. § 116, 120 Stat. at 211–13; see also, e.g., id. § 115, 120 Stat. at 211 (clarifying an NSL 
recipient’s right to challenge a gag order in a United States district court), invalidated by Doe v. 
Gonzales (Doe III), 500 F. Supp. 2d 379, 425 (2007). 
 36. Sales, supra note 7, at 852. 
 37. 18 U.S.C. § 2709(c)(1) (2006). 
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the FBI need only assert that disclosing the existence of the NSL 
would interfere with an investigation or endanger national security to 
issue a gag order.38 Additionally, the provision does not impose time 
limits, so gag orders last indefinitely.39 Finally, the provision does not 
require the FBI to seek judicial authorization at any point in the 
process. 
At the same time it modified the nondisclosure provision, 
Congress added 18 U.S.C. § 3511, which explicitly allows judicial 
review of NSLs and NSL gag orders.40 The statute, though, places the 
burden of going to court on the recipient,41 grants a very deferential 
standard of review,42 and limits how often a person may challenge an 
NSL.43 If the recipient seeks review within one year, the court can set 
aside or modify the gag order only if it finds “there is no reason to 
believe that disclosure may endanger the national security of the 
United States, interfere with a criminal, counterterrorism, or 
counterintelligence investigation, interfere with diplomatic relations, 
or endanger the life or physical safety of any person.”44 Even this 
token review is limited, however, because the court must treat a 
certification by the agency that disclosure might endanger national 
security or interfere with diplomatic relations as conclusive unless it 
finds that the determination was made in bad faith.45 If the recipient 
seeks review after more than a year, the issuing agency must either 
terminate the gag order or recertify its necessity.46 If the agency 
recertifies, the court applies the same “no reason to believe” analysis 
 
 38. E.g., id.; see also Shankman, supra note 6, at 256 (“[Section] 2709 allows the FBI to 
issue self-certified NSLs without any judicial oversight or notice, and the recipient is completely 
barred from disclosure.”). 
 39. DOYLE, supra note 3, at 12. 
 40. USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005 § 115(2), 120 Stat. at 
211. 
 41. 18 U.S.C. § 3511(b)(1) (2006) (“The recipient of a request for records . . . may . . .  
petition . . . for an order modifying or setting aside a nondisclosure requirement . . . .”). 
 42. Id. § 3511(b)(2) (“[T]he court may modify or set aside such a nondisclosure 
requirement if it finds that there is no reason to believe that disclosure may endanger the 
national security of the United States . . . .”). 
 43. Id. § 3511(b)(3) (“If the court denies a petition for an order modifying or setting aside a 
nondisclosure requirement under this paragraph, the recipient shall be precluded for a period of 
one year from filing another petition to modify or set aside such nondisclosure requirement.”). 
 44. Id. § 3511(b)(2). 
 45. Id. 
 46. Id. § 3511(b)(3). 
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as it does in a first-year challenge.47 Additionally, a recipient must 
wait one year after an unsuccessful challenge before rechallenging.48 
Taken together, these provisions give the FBI (or any other 
issuing agency) a self-certifying and self-sustaining gag order 
authority. The FBI possesses nearly complete discretion in deciding 
when to issue a gag order. Moreover, if the matter is challenged in 
court, the FBI need only repeat its certification or offer a reason that 
ties the use of the gag order to national security. Because of the 
difficulty of judicial intervention, this unfettered discretion means gag 
orders can last indefinitely. For the reasons discussed in Part II, such 
broad and unchecked gag-order authority violates the First 
Amendment’s prohibition on prior restraints and content-based 
restrictions of speech. 
II.  NATIONAL SECURITY LETTER GAG ORDERS AS 
UNCONSTITUTIONAL PRIOR RESTRAINTS AND CONTENT-BASED 
RESTRICTIONS 
The broad discretion and blanket speech prohibitions associated 
with NSL gag orders raise significant constitutional issues,49 but only 
two recipients have challenged their gag orders in court, and higher 
courts have yet to address the merits.50 In Doe v. Gonzales (Doe III),51 
one district court held that the Electronic Communications Privacy 
 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. 
 49. See supra Part I.B. 
 50. Doe v. Gonzales (Doe II), 386 F. Supp. 2d 66 (D. Conn. 2005), appeal dismissed, 449 
F.3d 415 (2d Cir. 2006); Doe v. Ashcroft (Doe I), 334 F. Supp. 2d 471 (S.D.N.Y. 2004), vacated 
sub nom. Doe v. Gonzales, 449 F.3d 415 (2d Cir. 2006). For a more detailed description of the 
procedural history of the Doe cases, including their treatment on appeal, see infra note 52. The 
strong nondisclosure language in the NSL provisions likely explains this dearth of litigation; a 
party that believes it has no choice but to comply and is uncertain whether it can even consult an 
attorney is unlikely to challenge a secret FBI request in court. See Nieland, supra note 20, at 
1232 (“The NSLs’ impressive track record suggests an obvious truth: recipients are more likely 
to comply with a demand if they feel they have little choice.”). Prior to the 2006 amendments, a 
plain reading of an NSL nondisclosure provision made it appear that a recipient could not tell 
anyone, including a supervisor or an attorney, about the request. See Shankman, supra note 6, at 
257 (“An unsophisticated service provider may interpret this to proscribe any avenue of 
challenging an NSL and, combined with the gag order, may never consult outside counsel to 
discover otherwise.”). 
 51. Doe v. Gonzales (Doe III), 500 F. Supp. 2d 379 (S.D.N.Y. 2007). 
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Act NSL nondisclosure provision violated the First Amendment.52 
The court ruled that the provision was a licensing scheme lacking 
necessary procedural safeguards53 and that the speech restriction was 
not narrowly tailored to the government’s interest in protecting a 
national security investigation.54 Further, the court invalidated the § 
3511 judicial-review mechanism under both the First Amendment and 
the separation of powers doctrine but stayed its order pending 
appeal.55 
As one of the first cases to analyze the NSL nondisclosure 
provisions, the Doe III decision is informative but not conclusive. Doe 
III, although partially correct, presents an incomplete analysis of the 
First Amendment issues the nondisclosure provisions raise. This Part 
builds from Doe III by examining three reasons that NSL 
nondisclosure provisions fail in light of First Amendment prior 
 
 52. Id. at 425. Only one decision has ultimately emerged, but the history behind these 
challenges is somewhat more involved. In 2004, an anonymous electronic communications 
provider challenged an NSL and its accompanying gag order in the Southern District of New 
York, leading to Doe I. Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 13, Doe I, 334 F. 
Supp. 2d 471 (No. 04 Civ. 02614), 2004 WL 5381887. A year later, another anonymous provider 
filed suit in the District of Connecticut, leading to Doe II, 386 F. Supp. 2d at 68 (“On August 9, 
2005, the plaintiffs filed suit . . . .”). 
 Both suits involved challenges to Electronic Communications Privacy Act NSLs issued 
under § 2709, and both anonymous plaintiffs claimed First, Fourth, and Fifth Amendment 
violations. Id. at 69; Doe I, 334 F. Supp. 2d at 475. The Doe I court held that the NSL violated 
the Fourth Amendment and that the gag order violated the First Amendment. id. at 526–27. 
The court enjoined the government from issuing § 2709 NSLs or enforcing gag orders, but 
stayed its order pending appeal. Id. at 527. The Doe II court granted the plaintiff’s motion to 
enjoin enforcement of the NSL gag order, but also stayed its order pending appeal. Doe II, 386 
F. Supp. 2d at 83. 
 Doe I and Doe II were consolidated on appeal to the Second Circuit Court of Appeals 
in Doe v. Gonzales, 449 F.3d 415 (2d Cir. 2006), but during the appeal Congress amended the 
NSL nondisclosure provisions and added § 3511, which specifies a judicial review process, USA 
PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-177, §§ 115–16, 120 
Stat. 192, 211–17 (2006) (codified in scattered sections of 12, 15, and 18 U.S.C. and to be 
codified in 50 U.S.C. § 436(b)). The Second Circuit vacated and remanded Doe I for 
reconsideration under the new statutes, Gonzales, 449 F.3d at 419 (vacating as moot the Doe I 
Fourth Amendment claims and vacating and remanding the First Amendment claims), and 
dismissed Doe II as moot, id. at 420–21 (dismissing Doe II as moot because the government 
conceded that it would not oppose the district court’s order lifting the gag order and allowing 
Doe II to identify itself). On remand, the Doe I case became Doe v. Gonzales (Doe III), 500 F. 
Supp. 2d at 386. Although this Note does not discuss Doe I or Doe II in detail, it uses the Doe 
III terminology for consistency with the federal courts. 
 53. Doe III, 500 F. Supp. 2d at 405–06. 
 54. Id. at 425. 
 55. Id. 
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restraint and content-based restriction jurisprudence. Specifically, 
Section A shows why the NSL nondisclosure provisions lack the 
necessary safeguards for a licensing scheme as required by Freedman 
v. Maryland.56 Section B establishes why the NSL provisions provide 
the investigating authority with too much discretion. Section C 
demonstrates that the nondisclosure provisions are not sufficiently 
narrowly tailored to the government’s interest. 
A. Failure under the Freedman Safeguards 
The Supreme Court has held that unfettered prior restraints on 
speech violate the First Amendment because they prevent speech 
before it even begins.57 The NSL nondisclosure provisions are classic 
examples of prior restraints because they completely prohibit 
recipients from talking to anyone (except their lawyers) about the 
NSLs.58 In Freedman, the Supreme Court established three minimum 
safeguards that any system of prior restraints must incorporate. This 
Section first shows that NSL nondisclosure provisions fail to 
incorporate these necessary safeguards. It then rebuts an argument 
that, because recipients only learn about NSLs through involvement 
in a government investigation, the Freedman safeguards do not apply. 
1. NSL Nondisclosure Provisions Fail to Satisfy the Freedman 
Safeguards.  In Freedman, the Supreme Court held that a prior 
restraint system is only constitutional if it satisfies three procedural 
requirements: (1) the government must bear the burden of proving 
the speech should be prohibited, (2) the initial restraint must be only 
as long as necessary to allow the parties to obtain judicial review of 
the government’s censorship, and (3) the review process must ensure 
a prompt, final judicial resolution.59 The NSL nondisclosure 
provisions comply with the second and third Freedman safeguards but 
fail to satisfy the first. 
 
 56. Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51, 58 (1965). 
 57. Id. at 57–58. 
 58. See Alexander v. United States, 509 U.S. 544, 550 (1993) (“The term ‘prior restraint’ is 
used ‘to describe administrative and judicial orders forbidding certain communications when 
issued in advance of the time that such communications occur.’” (quoting MELVILLE B. 
NIMMER, NIMMER ON FREEDOM OF SPEECH § 4.03 (1984))). The Alexander Court observed 
that “[t]emporary restraining orders and permanent injunctions—i.e., court orders that actually 
forbid speech activities—are classic examples of prior restraints.” Id. 
 59. Freedman, 380 U.S. at 58–59. 
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Taking the Freedman prongs out of order, NSL nondisclosure 
provisions satisfy the second and third prongs of the Freedman test 
because § 3511 allows recipients to challenge gag orders in a federal 
district court at any time.60 Section 3511 satisfies the second prong—
requiring a short-lived initial prohibition—because it allows the 
recipient to challenge the gag order the moment the recipient receives 
it.61 Section 3511 satisfies the third prong—ensuring prompt, final 
judicial resolution—because it specifically authorizes the recipient to 
contest the gag order in federal district court. In City of Littleton v. Z. 
J. Gifts D-4, L.L.C.,62 the Supreme Court held that permitting normal 
access to the courts, including the federal district courts, satisfies the 
need for prompt, final judicial review in part because courts have 
procedural tools that can accelerate proceedings when necessary.63 
Allowing recipients to challenge gag orders in district courts thus lets 
recipients avail themselves of the same process Z. J. Gifts approved.64 
The NSL nondisclosure provisions run afoul of the first 
Freedman safeguard, however, by dictating a very deferential 
standard of review that strongly favors the government and by 
requiring the recipient to initiate judicial review.65 Under § 3511, a 
court can modify or set aside a nondisclosure order only if it “finds 
that there is no reason to believe that disclosure may endanger the 
national security of the United States” or otherwise interfere with an 
 
 60. See 18 U.S.C. § 3511(b)(1) (2006) (“The recipient of a request for records . . . may . . . 
petition [a United States district court] for an order modifying or setting aside a nondisclosure 
requirement . . . .”). The Doe III decision held § 3511(b) unconstitutional but declined to 
address whether § 3511(b) is severable from the rest of § 3511. Doe III, 500 F. Supp. 2d at 425. 
Whether this subsection is severable is largely immaterial for this discussion because this Note’s 
proposed modification to the NSL nondisclosure provisions envisions prompt access to judicial 
review in a manner that goes beyond § 3511(b). See infra Part III.A. 
 61. Cf. Freedman, 380 U.S. at 60 (endorsing as a model a prior restraint scheme that held a 
hearing the day after the restraint was issued). 
 62. City of Littleton v. Z. J. Gifts D-4, L. L. C., 541 U.S. 774 (2004). 
 63. Id. at 782 (“First, ordinary court procedural rules and practices, in Colorado as 
elsewhere, provide reviewing courts with judicial tools sufficient to avoid delay-related First 
Amendment harm.”); Beal v. Stern, 184 F.3d 117, 129 (2d Cir. 1999) (“Similarly, prompt access 
to judicial review in state courts would satisfy Freedman . . . .”). 
 64. Although the dearth of NSL gag order litigation suggests that most NSL gag orders are 
not actually reviewed by courts, the recipients at least have the opportunity to challenge them, 
and this opportunity begins the moment the recipient receives the gag order. The solution 
advanced in this Note, though, goes further and would guarantee judicial review of every gag 
order lasting longer than a certain length of time. See infra Part III.A. 
 65. See 18 U.S.C. § 3511(b)(1) (“The recipient of a request for records . . . may 
petition . . . .”); id. §§ 3511(b)(2)–(3) (applying a deferential “no reason to believe” standard). 
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investigation.66 Thus, if the court can identify any reason whatsoever 
why disclosure might hamper an investigation or threaten national 
security, a very nebulous concept, it may not set aside the 
nondisclosure provision. Furthermore, even if the court were 
convinced that there is no reason to believe such harm would occur, a 
certification by the FBI that disclosure would be harmful must be 
treated as conclusive unless the court finds that the certification was 
made in bad faith.67 
Freedman places the burden of proving that the First 
Amendment does not protect an expression on the censor.68 The NSL 
judicial review provision stands in sharp contrast to this standard; 
under § 3511(b), “the court may modify or set aside such a 
nondisclosure requirement if it finds that there is no reason to believe 
that disclosure may endanger the national security of the United 
States.”69 This “no reason to believe” standard is very deferential70 
and could conceivably force a court to uphold a nondisclosure 
provision if it had any reason to believe disclosure would endanger 
national security, even if the reason was tenuous and the danger 
slight. Quite simply, this standard fails to satisfy the first Freedman 
safeguard because it incorrectly places the burden of proof on the 
NSL recipient, not the government. 
The NSL judicial review provision also fails because it requires 
the recipient to challenge the nondisclosure provision. Freedman held 
that in the film-censoring context “the exhibitor must be assured, by 
statute or authoritative judicial construction, that the censor will, 
within a specified brief period, either issue a license or go to court to 
restrain showing the film.”71 Thus, Freedman places the burden of 
 
 66. Id. § 3511(b)(2). 
 67. See id. (“If, at the time of the petition, the [issuing authority] . . . certifies that disclosure 
may endanger the national security of the United States or interfere with diplomatic relations, 
such certification shall be treated as conclusive unless the court finds that the certification was 
made in bad faith.”). 
 68. Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51, 58 (1965). 
 69. 18 U.S.C. § 3511(b)(2) (emphasis added). 
 70. See Christopher P. Raab, Note, Fighting Terrorism in an Electronic Age: Does the 
Patriot Act Unduly Compromise Our Civil Liberties?, 2006 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 3, ¶ 46, 
http://www.law.duke.edu/journals/dltr/articles/pdf/2006dltr0003.pdf (“Yet although the NSL 
itself could be challenged, the court could only overturn the request if it was unreasonable or 
oppressive. The case law surrounding administrative subpoenas makes it clear that a court will 
rarely overturn a request on those grounds.”). 
 71. Freedman, 380 U.S. at 58–59 (emphasis added). 
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initiation on the government; the government’s alternatives are to 
initiate a judicial proceeding or allow the speech. The NSL review 
provision is just the opposite: “[t]he recipient of a request for 
records . . . may petition . . . for an order modifying or setting aside a 
nondisclosure requirement imposed in connection with such a 
request.”72 As with the allocation of the burden of proof, the 
provision forcing the NSL recipient to go to court to challenge the 
order is at odds with Freedman. 
2. The Freedman Safeguards Apply to NSL Nondisclosure 
Provisions.  In one of its briefs in the Doe cases, the government 
argued that information a person learns because of involvement in a 
secret government investigation should be treated differently than 
regular information and that NSL gag orders thus warrant less 
rigorous protections.73 This distinction ultimately fails, though, and 
the NSL nondisclosure provisions must satisfy Freedman. 
In Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart,74 the Supreme Court upheld a 
judicial order prohibiting a litigant newspaper from publishing 
information about the opposing party that the newspaper obtained 
solely through discovery related to the litigation.75 Although the 
Court held that a less-exacting scrutiny applied, it framed its analysis 
as a tailoring issue76: “In addressing [this] question it is necessary to 
consider whether . . . ‘the limitation of First Amendment freedoms 
[is] no greater than is necessary or essential to the protection of the 
particular governmental interest involved.’”77 The Court observed 
that information gained through judicial discovery was different than 
information a litigant already possessed independent of the litigation 
because “control over the discovered information does not raise the 
same specter of government censorship that such control might 
 
 72. 18 U.S.C. § 3511(b)(1). 
 73. Brief for the Defendants-Appellants at 51–52, Doe v. Gonzales, 449 F.3d 415 (2d Cir. 
2006), 2005 WL 5289205. 
 74. Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20 (1984). 
 75. Id. at 32. 
 76. Although the Court used tailoring language, it also appears interested in comparing the 
First Amendment interests impinged with the government interests at stake. See id. (“[I]t is 
important to recognize the extent of the impairment of the First Amendment rights that a 
protective order, such as the one at issue here, may cause.”). 
 77. Id. (quoting Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 413 (1974), overruled by Thornburgh 
v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401 (1989)). 
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suggest in other situations.”78 In reaching this decision, the Court 
considered the “substantial interest” the government had in 
preventing abuse of judicial discovery and the threats to a litigant’s 
privacy and reputation that such abuse posed.79 
The Court refined its analysis in Butterworth v. Smith,80 a 
decision invalidating a Florida law that permanently prohibited grand 
jury witnesses from disclosing their testimony even after the grand 
jury term ended.81 Again reflecting a tailoring analysis, the Court 
acknowledged the state’s interest in maintaining the secrecy of the 
investigation but concluded that “we do not believe those interests 
warrant a permanent ban on the disclosure by a witness of his own 
testimony once a grand jury has been discharged.”82 The Court 
pointed out the weak nexus between prohibiting disclosure even after 
the grand jury disbands and the state’s interest in maintaining secret 
grand jury investigations: “When an investigation ends, there is no 
longer a need to keep information from the targeted individual in 
order to prevent his escape—that individual presumably will have 
been exonerated, on the one hand, or arrested or otherwise informed 
of the charges against him, on the other.”83 As it concluded its 
opinion, the Court also pointed out the potential for abuse if the 
government used the nondisclosure provision to silence individuals 
with knowledge of unlawful conduct by public officials.84 
The Court did not mention Freedman in either the Seattle Times 
Co. or the Butterworth decision. Instead, those decisions focus on 
applying a tailoring analysis to the particular nondisclosure laws. This 
approach is distinct from deciding whether a nondisclosure provision 
satisfies procedural safeguards. In differentiating this line of cases, the 
Doe III court explained that the applicability of the Freedman 
safeguards depends, not on the value of the underlying speech, but 
rather on “whether [the] safeguard[s] [are] essential to preventing 
unwarranted restrictions on speech.”85 The focus thus should not be 
 
 78. Id. 
 79. Id. at 35. 
 80. Butterworth v. Smith, 494 U.S. 624 (1990). 
 81. Id. at 626. 
 82. Id. at 632. 
 83. Id. 
 84. Id. at 635–36. 
 85. Doe v. Gonzalez (Doe III), 500 F. Supp. 2d 379, 404 (S.D.N.Y. 2007). 
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on how important the speech might be, but rather on how important 
safeguards are to prevent speech suppression. 
The NSL nondisclosure provisions especially require safeguards 
to prevent unwarranted speech restrictions. NSL recipients are 
particularly poorly suited to challenge NSL nondisclosure provisions. 
NSLs are issued to third parties rather than to the actual targets of an 
investigation, and the third parties have little or no incentive to 
challenge the NSL.86 NSL recipients can be consumer credit reporting 
agencies,87 financial institutions,88 or electronic communications 
providers,89 and it seems unlikely that these institutions would 
willingly shoulder the time and expense of litigation and possibly 
incur the ire of a powerful federal agency. Additionally, NSL 
nondisclosure provisions prohibit speech about secret governmental 
investigative methods—speech that only the NSL recipient is able to 
provide.90 Speech about how the government uses investigative tools 
such as NSLs is the type of core, political speech that lies at the heart 
of First Amendment protection.91 Given that the Freedman 
 
 86. Id. at 406 (“Such a challenge would be time consuming and financially burdensome, 
and . . . the NSL recipient’s business does not depend on overturning the particular form of 
restriction on its speech.”). 
 87. 15 U.S.C. § 1681u(b) (2006) (“[A] consumer reporting agency shall furnish identifying 
information respecting a consumer . . . when presented with a written request . . . .”). 
 88. 50 U.S.C. § 436(a)(1) (2000) (“Any authorized investigative agency may request from 
any . . . financial institution . . . financial records . . . .”). 
 89. 18 U.S.C. § 2709(a) (2006) (“A wire or electronic communication service provider shall 
comply with a request for subscriber information . . . .”). 
 90. Although an NSL recipient is poorly situated to challenge a nondisclosure provision, 
the recipient is not necessarily poorly situated to provide information about NSLs if the 
nondisclosure provision were not in place. For example, a business might not wish to incur the 
cost of litigation to challenge a nondisclosure provision, but the business might be interested in 
producing statistics about the number of NSLs it receives each year if it were allowed to. 
 91. See Morse v. Frederick, 127 S. Ct. 2618, 2626 (2007) (“Political speech, of course, is ‘at 
the core of what the First Amendment is designed to protect.’” (quoting Virginia v. Black, 538 
U.S. 343, 365 (2003))); Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359, 369 (1931) (“The maintenance of 
the opportunity for free political discussion to the end that government may be responsive to 
the will of the people and that changes may be obtained by lawful means, an opportunity 
essential to the security of the Republic, is a fundamental principle of our constitutional 
system.”); Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech, Permissible Tailoring and Transcending Strict 
Scrutiny, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2417, 2419 (1996) (“The government can have no compelling 
interest in privileging particular subclasses of core protected speech—discussion about 
economic, social and political matters—over other subclasses. All such core protected speech 
‘rest[s] on the highest rung of the hierarchy of First Amendment values.’” (alteration in 
original) (quoting Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 467 (1980))). 
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safeguards arose to protect potentially obscene speech,92 it seems 
reasonable to afford the same procedural protections to political 
speech about NSLs. Therefore, the Freedman safeguards seem 
particularly well suited for NSL nondisclosure provisions. 
B. The Issuing Authority’s Broad Discretion 
Not only do the NSL nondisclosure provisions fail to incorporate 
the Freedman safeguards, but they also give the issuing authority 
unbridled discretion to impose prior restraints on speech. 
Recognizing that “the censor’s business is to censor,”93 First 
Amendment law generally discourages providing the censoring 
authority with too much discretion. 
Under well-established law, “objective[] and definite standards” 
must guide government officials determining whether to issue a prior 
restraint on speech.94 In striking down a city ordinance giving the city 
commission discretion to issue a parade permit, the Supreme Court 
cautioned in Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham95 that the ordinance 
gave the officials “virtually unbridled and absolute power” to approve 
or reject the license.96 Additionally, the Court emphasized that “we 
have consistently condemned licensing systems which vest in an 
administrative official discretion to grant or withhold a permit upon 
broad criteria.”97 
The Court struck down a similar ordinance in City of Lakewood 
v. Plain Dealer Publishing98 because the law gave the city’s mayor too 
much discretion to locate and place newspaper vending machines.99 
As in Shuttlesworth, the ordinance failed under First Amendment 
analysis because “the face of the ordinance itself contains no explicit 
 
 92. See Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51, 52 (1965) (“Appellant sought to challenge the 
constitutionality of the Maryland motion picture censorship statute . . . .”). 
 93. Id. at 57. 
 94. Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147, 151 (1969). As early as 1969, the 
concept that objective principles must guide a government censor or licensor was well enough 
established that the Shuttlesworth Court could observe that the ordinance in question “fell 
squarely within the ambit of the many decisions of this Court over the last 30 years” and could 
cite to seventeen earlier Supreme Court decisions in support. Id. at 150, 151 n.2. 
 95. Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147 (1969). 
 96. Id. at 150. 
 97. Id. at 153. 
 98. City of Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Publ’g, 486 U.S. 750 (1988). 
 99. Id. at 772. 
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limits on the mayor’s discretion . . . . [and] nothing in the law as 
written requires the mayor to do more than make the statement ‘it is 
not in the public interest’ when denying a permit application.”100 The 
Court also dismissed the government’s arguments that the mayor 
would follow good-faith standards not explicitly written into the 
ordinance, commenting that “this is the very presumption that the 
doctrine forbidding unbridled discretion disallows.”101 As these two 
cases illustrate, the Court distrusts statutes granting government 
officials broad discretion to prohibit speech.102 
Despite Shuttlesworth’s and Plain Dealer Publishing’s guidance 
to reign in the discretion of executive officials, the NSL nondisclosure 
provisions confer the wide amount of discretion that the Court has 
repeatedly rejected. Under 18 U.S.C. § 2709, for example, the FBI can 
impose a gag order merely by certifying that disclosure would 
endanger national security or interfere with an investigation.103 This 
requirement is akin to the situation in Plain Dealer Publishing, when 
the mayor could deny a permit by simply certifying that “it is not in 
the public interest.”104 
The Doe III court considered the breadth of discretion given to 
the issuing authority, but ultimately—and erroneously—acquiesced to 
the broad grant of discretion. Although it held that § 2709 failed the 
Freedman safeguards, the Doe III court was not as troubled by the 
provision’s broad grant of discretion.105 The court acknowledged 
Shuttlesworth and Plain Dealer Publishing and agreed “that a 
standard relating to endangering ‘national security’ is susceptible to 
very broad interpretation,” but opined that statutes cannot always be 
written with complete specificity.106 Observing that “[t]he context of 
counterterrorism investigations requires that the FBI have a degree 
 
 100. Id. at 769. 
 101. Id. at 770. 
 102. These two cases are merely representative of a rich and well-established jurisprudence 
rendering statutes that give government officials unbridled discretion to restrain speech 
unconstitutional. See supra note 94. 
 103. 18 U.S.C. § 2709(c)(1) (2006). For a proposal that limits the FBI’s discretion without 
hamstringing its investigative ability, see infra Part III.B. 
 104. Plain Dealer Publ’g, 486 U.S. at 769. 
 105. See Doe v. Gonzales (Doe III), 500 F. Supp. 2d 379, 408 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) (“[T]he Court 
is not persuaded that the FBI’s discretion under § 2709(c) is so unrestrained as to rise to the 
level of a constitutional infirmity.”). 
 106. Id. 
EYINK IN FINAL[1].DOC 11/16/2008  10:05:58 PM 
2008] CONSTITUTIONAL SECRECY 493 
 
of discretion in using NSLs,” the court deferred to the elected 
branches’ choices on this matter of national security.107 
Despite consistent case law encouraging courts to closely 
examine prior restraints based on broad discretion, the district court 
deferred to the executive and legislative branches. The court realized 
that although “the rubric of ‘national security’ has been abused on 
occasion[, that] does not imply that the Court should presume the 
language of ‘national security’ in § 2709(c) necessarily affords 
unfettered discretion to the FBI likely to result in abuse.”108 Although, 
as the court correctly acknowledged, the FBI will not necessarily 
abuse its discretion, courts should not necessarily defer to the FBI 
either. In fact, the court’s position essentially assumes good faith on 
the part of the FBI, “[b]ut this is the very presumption that the 
doctrine forbidding unbridled discretion disallows.”109 
Moreover, in a report about NSLs issued by the FBI between 
2003 and 2005, the Office of the Inspector General revealed that 22 
percent of the NSL files it surveyed had some sort of internal-control 
violation not reported to the proper oversight bodies,110 leading the 
inspector general to conclude, “[b]ased on our review and the 
significant percentage of files that contained unreported possible 
violations . . . we believe that a significant number of NSL-related 
possible violations are not being identified or reported by the FBI.”111 
Additionally, the report found that 60 percent of the files it examined 
contained a violation of the FBI’s internal control policy for NSLs.112 
Although the report made clear it found no evidence of criminal 
misconduct, it seems inappropriate to defer to the FBI with such a 
cursory review when the FBI routinely misuses NSL authority. 
 
 107. Id. 
 108. Id. 
 109. Plain Dealer Publ’g, 486 U.S. at 770. 
 110. OIG REPORT, supra note 2, at 78. In its review of seventy-seven representative files, 
the OIG report found twenty-two possible violations, and 22 percent of those files had 
violations that were not reported to the proper oversight authorities. Id. at xxxiii. The report 
grouped the violations into three broad categories: improperly authorized NSLs, improper 
requests under the NSL statutes, and collection of unauthorized information. Id. at xxxi. The 
twenty-two violations found in the seventy-seven sampled files were nearly as many as the 
twenty-six violations that the FBI identified in the entire three-year period represented by the 
sampled files. Id. at xxxiii. 
 111. Id. at 123. 
 112. Id. 
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The Doe III court had access to the inspector general’s report113 
but rationalized that “the best protection against abuse of the FBI’s 
discretion in certifying nondisclosure is to ensure that such discretion 
is checked by meaningful and reasonably expeditious judicial 
review.”114 Although the district court’s holding required stronger and 
more immediate judicial review, the Supreme Court observed in Plain 
Dealer Publishing that “[e]ven if judicial review were relatively 
speedy, such review cannot substitute for concrete standards to guide 
the decisionmaker’s discretion.”115 
By yielding to the FBI’s national security claim, the Doe III court 
abdicated its responsibility to hold the FBI and all other NSL-issuing 
authorities’ discretion to the strict standards that Shuttlesworth and 
Plain Dealer Publishing require. In practice, the NSL provisions 
permit the issuing authority to impose a permanent gag order merely 
by claiming a vague national security interest. This grants the issuing 
authority too much discretion, intruding too far into First 
Amendment rights.116 
C. NSL Restrictions Are Not Narrowly Tailored to the Government’s 
National Security Interest 
In addition to granting the FBI too much discretion and failing to 
properly incorporate the Freedman safeguards, the NSL 
nondisclosure provisions fail to narrowly tailor gag orders to the 
government’s interest in maintaining security. The NSL nondisclosure 
provisions fail this narrow tailoring requirement because they can last 
indefinitely—well beyond the point at which disclosure would still 
implicate national security interests—and because they prohibit all 
speech, not merely speech that would threaten the government’s 
interest in national security. 
An NSL gag order is by definition a content-based restriction on 
speech;117 an NSL recipient with a gag order cannot talk about the 
 
 113. See Doe III, 500 F. Supp. 2d at 390 (referring to and citing the OIG report). 
 114. Id. at 409. 
 115. City of Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Publ’g, 486 U.S. 750, 771 (1988). 
 116. See Aditi A. Prabhu, Contracting for Financial Privacy: The Rights of Banks and 
Customers Under the Reauthorized Patriot Act, 39 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 51, 59 (2007) (“[T]he NSL 
issuance process involves few procedural safeguards to balance individual privacy against 
competing governmental interests.”). 
 117. See United States v. Playboy Entm’t Group, 529 U.S. 803, 811 (2000) (“The speech in 
question is defined by its content; and the statute which seeks to restrict it is content based.”). 
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NSL.118 Content-based restrictions on speech are subject to strict 
scrutiny, and the restriction must be narrowly tailored to promote a 
compelling government interest.119 Under narrow tailoring, the 
government must use the least restrictive means available to meet its 
purpose, which means a content-based restriction is unconstitutional 
if the legislature has overlooked a less restrictive approach.120 
The Doe III court took issue with the permanency of the gag 
orders, commenting that “it is hard to conceive of any circumstances 
that would justify a permanent bar on disclosure.”121 Because gag 
orders can last indefinitely,122 the nondisclosure provision’s duration 
has only a weak nexus with the government’s compelling interest—
protecting national security. Accordingly, the nondisclosure 
provisions are not narrowly tailored because they can remain in place 
long beyond the time needed to protect national security or the 
integrity of an investigation.123 Instead, rather than being narrowly 
tailored to minimally impact speech, the nondisclosure provisions can 
permanently prohibit the citizens arguably most qualified to discuss 
the use and effects of NSLs from entering the public debate.124 
Moreover, the nondisclosure provisions identify national 
security, the integrity of investigations, diplomatic relations, and 
protecting individuals from harm as the compelling interests being 
protected.125 But the provisions prohibit all speech, and a blanket 
 
 118. The Electronic Communications Privacy Act NSL, for example, generally prohibits a 
recipient from disclosing the existence of the NSL: 
If the [investigating authority] certifies that otherwise there may result a danger to 
the national security of the United States . . . no wire or electronic communications 
service provider . . . shall disclose to any person (other than those to whom such 
disclosure is necessary to comply with the request or an attorney to obtain legal 
advice or legal assistance with respect to the request) that the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation has sought or obtained access to information or records under this 
section. 
18 U.S.C. § 2709(c)(1) (2006); see also text accompanying notes 36–38. 
 119. Playboy Entm’t Group, 529 U.S. at 813. 
 120. See id. (“If a less restrictive alternative would serve the Government’s purpose, the 
legislature must use that alternative.”). 
 121. Doe v. Gonzales (Doe III), 500 F. Supp. 2d 379, 421 (S.D.N.Y. 2007). 
 122. See id. at 420 (“For example, an NSL recipient cannot communicate to anyone 
indefinitely that it received an NSL . . . .”). 
 123. Id. at 422. 
 124. See id. at 420 (“NSL recipients are effectively barred from engaging in any discussion 
regarding their experiences and opinions related to the government’s use of NSLs.”). 
 125. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 2709(c)(1) (2006) (allowing a blanket gag order when there is “a 
danger to the national security of the United States, interference with a criminal, 
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prohibition does not seem to be the least restrictive means to protect 
these interests. A large communications provider, for example, might 
receive thousands of NSLs, and thus revealing aggregate information 
about NSLs would not jeopardize national security or an ongoing 
investigation. Because NSL nondisclosure provisions prohibit speech 
that does not threaten these government interests, the provisions fail 
narrow tailoring in this regard as well. 
III.  RECONCILING NATIONAL SECURITY LETTERS WITH FIRST 
AMENDMENT JURISPRUDENCE 
NSL gag orders address real national security concerns, and they 
can meet constitutional standards. But existing NSL nondisclosure 
provisions conflict with important First Amendment rights. 
Ultimately, the issue becomes how to structure a constitutionally 
valid NSL gag order—one that allows the government to effectively 
investigate threats to national security while also protecting each 
citizen’s right to speak freely and to participate in public debate. To 
reconcile NSL nondisclosure provisions with First Amendment 
jurisprudence, the provisions must (1) incorporate the Freedman 
safeguards, (2) ensure that issuing authorities do not have unfettered 
discretion, and (3) narrowly tailor gag orders to prohibit the least 
amount of speech for the shortest duration. A constitutional 
nondisclosure provision would require the government to seek 
judicial authorization after an initial grace period, to possess specific 
reasons for issuing the gag order, and to craft gag orders that account 
for the recipients’ individual situations. 
A. Shifting the Burden of Seeking Judicial Review to the Government 
Complying with the Freedman safeguards requires prompt 
judicial review, limited restraints until a final judicial decision, and a 
burden on the government to seek such review and to prove the 
necessity of the restraint.126 As the Doe III court observed, immediate 
 
counterterrorism, or counterintelligence investigation, interference with diplomatic relations, or 
danger to the life or physical safety of any person”). 
 126. See Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51, 58–59 (1965) (“First, the burden of proving 
that the film is unprotected expression must rest on the censor. . . . [Second,] the censor will, 
within a specified brief period, either issue a license or go to court to restrain showing the film. 
[Third, a]ny restraint imposed in advance of a final judicial determination on the merits must 
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access to regular judicial proceedings satisfies the first two 
safeguards.127 The third safeguard could be met either by requiring the 
issuing authority to seek judicial authorization before issuing the NSL 
or by allowing a government authority to issue an NSL with a 
temporary gag order but requiring the authority to seek judicial 
review within a specified time frame. 
The first option—requiring prior judicial authorization—likely 
swings the balance too far the other way, overfavoring First 
Amendment rights relative to the government’s interest in 
maintaining secrecy in national security–related investigations.128 
After all, even the Freedman Court acknowledged that speech could 
be temporarily restrained while awaiting judicial review.129 
Additionally, such a requirement would prevent the government from 
using NSLs as preliminary screening and background information-
gathering tools to generate information for Foreign Intelligence 
Surveillance Act of 1978 (FISA) requests.130 Instead, the second 
option—allowing the issuing authority to issue a temporary gag order 
and then requiring that authority to either drop the gag order or seek 
authorization from a court—effectively balances the government’s 
need to investigate without alerting the suspect or exposing its 
sources and methods with the recipient’s First Amendment 
 
similarly be limited to preservation of the status quo for the shortest fixed period compatible 
with sound judicial resolution.”). 
 127. See Doe III, 500 F. Supp. 2d at 401 (“‘[P]rompt access to judicial review in state courts’ 
would satisfy the first two Freedman protections. This conclusion holds true with respect to 
judicial review in federal courts as well.” (citation omitted) (quoting Beal v. Stern, 184 F.3d 117, 
129 (2d Cir. 1999))). 
 128. See id. at 406 (“That the government bears the burden of justifying the need for 
nondisclosure to a court does not mean that the FBI must obtain the approval a court prior to 
issuing an NSL with a nondisclosure order.”). 
 129. See Freedman, 380 U.S. at 59 (“Any restraint imposed in advance of a final judicial 
determination on the merits must similarly be limited to preservation of the status quo for the 
shortest fixed period compatible with sound judicial resolution.”). 
 130. See OIG REPORT, supra note 2, at xxii (“FBI personnel reported that the principal 
objectives for using NSLs are to: . . . establish evidence to support Foreign Intelligence 
Surveillance Act (FISA) applications to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court for 
electronic surveillance, physical searches, or pen register/trap and trace orders . . . .”). This use is 
a significant benefit to FBI agents when initially trying to develop a case because FISA 
surveillance, which is more invasive than an NSL request, typically requires preauthorization 
from the FISA court. See Sales, supra note 7, at 841 (“With a few exceptions, the government 
may not engage in these sorts of surveillance without submitting an application to and receiving 
approval from the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court . . . .”). 
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concerns.131 This second option would allow the investigating 
authority to covertly gather enough preliminary information to seek 
authorization for more invasive surveillance,132 while ultimately still 
allowing the NSL recipient to join public debate about NSLs.133 
Moreover, this solution would still allow the recipient to challenge the 
gag order at any point; the recipient would have the option to 
challenge the order, but the government would bear the burden of 
going to court to maintain it. 
As the Doe III court suggested, any temporary gag order must be 
limited in duration, and the issuing authority must be required to 
either seek authorization from a court to maintain the gag order or 
rescind the gag order within a specified time period.134 This initial time 
period must be short enough to ensure that the recipient can still 
meaningfully engage in the public discourse but long enough to 
protect the government’s national security interests. Congress likely 
has access to classified information about NSL investigations that 
shows how long the government needs to obtain and process 
information from an NSL request. Congress could then limit initial 
NSL gag orders to this length of time. If the investigation pans out, 
the court could grant a longer-lasting (but finite) gag order, thus 
protecting national security and the integrity of the investigation.135 If 
the investigation turns up nothing, the recipient would be free to 
discuss the NSL after that initial period. 
The fixed time period and guaranteed judicial review also 
compensate for the lack of incentive for most NSL recipients to 
challenge a gag order. As the Doe III court observed, most NSL 
recipients lack incentives to expend either the time or money 
necessary to fight a gag order.136 Therefore, although the recipient 
 
 131. See Doe III, 500 F. Supp. 2d at 406 (“Allowing the FBI to issue nondisclosure orders for 
a limited period of time prior to any judicial oversight balances the strong First Amendment 
concerns at issue with the FBI’s need to act quickly in conducting counterterrorism 
investigations.”). 
 132. See supra note 130. 
 133. Additionally, investigating authorities may be less likely to issue baseless or abusive 
NSLs if they know that the recipients will eventually be able to discuss the NSLs. 
 134. See Doe III, 500 F. Supp. 2d at 406 (“[T]he FBI may issue a temporary nondisclosure 
order on its own in accordance with the standards set forth in § 2709(c), provided that, within a 
reasonable and brief period of time, it must either notify the NSL recipient that the order is no 
longer in effect, or justify to a court the need for a continued period of nondisclosure.”). 
 135. For a discussion of the duration of a court-authorized gag order, see infra Part III.C. 
 136. Doe III, 500 F. Supp. 2d at 405. 
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would remain free to challenge the gag order at any point, even 
within the initial temporary period,137 the judicial process would 
ensure that all gag orders receive judicial review and comply with the 
First Amendment.138 
B. The Issuing Authority Must Have Objective Guidelines when 
Issuing Gag Orders 
As established in Shuttlesworth and its progeny, an official 
empowered to determine whether to issue a gag order must be guided 
by “narrow, objective, and definite standards.”139 Although an issuing 
authority needs leeway to effectively respond to national security 
threats, its discretion cannot be so broad that baldly claiming a 
national security concern can justify banning speech.140 
Congress could strike an appropriate balance by reviving the 
discarded “articulable facts” standard—which, prior to the Patriot 
Act, the government had to meet before issuing an NSL—and 
imposing that standard on NSL gag orders.141 Under this revived 
“articulable facts” standard, the investigating authority could impose 
a gag order as long as it had specific and articulable facts giving 
reason to believe that disclosure of the NSL would endanger national 
security, interfere with a criminal, counterterrorism, or 
 
 137. See id. at 406 (“This observation does not imply, however, that an NSL recipient may 
not, at any time, also petition a court to modify or set aside a nondisclosure order . . . .”). 
 138. Cf. Timothy Edgar & Witold Walczak, Perspectives on the USA Patriot Act: We Can Be 
Both Safe and Free: How the Patriot Act Threatens Civil Liberties, 76 PA. B. ASS’N Q. 21, 27 
(2005) (“Congress should enact legislation providing an ability to challenge a NSL in court, and 
limiting the time period for the secrecy provision that applies to all such letters.”). 
 139. Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147, 151 (1969). 
 140. Under the standard nondisclosure provisions, the FBI or a designee need only certify 
the disclosure “may result [in] a danger to the national security” or interfere with an 
investigation. E.g., 18 U.S.C. § 2709(c)(1) (2006) (emphasis added). But see New York Times v. 
United States, 403 U.S. 713, 719 (1971) (Black, J., concurring) (“The word ‘security’ is a broad, 
vague generality whose contours should not be invoked to abrogate the fundamental law 
embodied in the First Amendment.”). 
 141. Prior to the passage of the Patriot Act, to issue an NSL the director of the FBI or a 
designee had to certify that “there are specific and articulable facts giving reason to believe that 
the person or entity to whom the information sought pertains is a foreign power or an agent of a 
foreign power.” E.g., 18 U.S.C. § 2709(b)(1)(B) (2000), amended by Pub. L. No. 107-56,  
§ 505(a)(2), 115 Stat. 272, 365 (2001). 
EYINK IN FINAL[1].DOC 11/16/2008  10:05:58 PM 
500 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 58:473 
 
counterintelligence investigation, interfere with diplomatic relations, 
or endanger the life or physical safety of any person.142 
Although the specific and articulable facts standard determines 
whether certain searches are unconstitutional under the Fourth 
Amendment,143 it would function equally well to evaluate whether an 
investigating authority possesses and has produced specific evidence 
establishing why a gag order is required. This evidence would have to 
be relatively specific, but by no means conclusive, as to the threat 
posed by disclosure of the NSL. In United States v. Perrine,144 for 
example, the Tenth Circuit applied the specific and articulable facts 
standard to a government request for computer records as part of a 
child pornography investigation.145 Under the statute at issue in 
Perrine, the government had to “offer[] specific and articulable facts 
showing that there [were] reasonable grounds to believe” that the 
information sought would further the investigation.146 The 
government produced an affidavit that described an officer’s 
interview with a man who reported being sent child pornography in 
an internet chat room and that indicated the officer had viewed the 
chat room log, but the affidavit did not contain the actual text of the 
chat room log or any indication that the suspect in the investigation 
had been logged into his internet account when the chat occurred.147 
Applying the specific and articulable facts standard, the court held 
that despite the missing chat room logs and lack of verification that 
the suspect was logged into his account at the time, “[t]he details 
provided are specific and certainly would lead to a reasonable 
 
 142. Cf. id. (allowing the FBI to request information when “there are specific and 
articulable facts giving reason to believe that the person or entity to whom the information 
sought pertains is a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power”); see also supra text 
accompanying note 25. Note, though, that although this language is drawn from the pre–Patriot 
Act Electronic Communications Privacy Act NSL, it would not be used in this proposal as it was 
used in the old statute. Rather, the issuing authority would have to possess specific and 
articulable facts that a gag order is required to protect national security. 
 143. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968) (“And in justifying the particular intrusion the 
police officer must be able to point to specific and articulable facts which, taken together with 
rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant that intrusion.”). 
 144. United States v. Perrine, 518 F.3d 1196 (10th Cir. 2008). Perrine concerned a 
government request for computer records under 18 U.S.C. § 2703, which is another criminal 
investigatory tool included in the Electronic Communications Privacy Act, id. at 1201–02, but 
which is distinct from the Electronic Communications Privacy Act NSL discussed in this Note. 
 145. Id. at 1201–03. 
 146. Id. at 1202 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d)). 
 147. Id. at 1202–03. 
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suspicion that [the suspect] was involved in child pornography.”148 
Thus, as the Perrine example shows, the specific and articulable facts 
standard requires some degree of specificity but does not require 
anything resembling conclusive proof. 
This standard directly addresses one concern that the Supreme 
Court has repeatedly voiced, namely that an official could stifle 
speech with a mere assertion that the speech violated some vague 
standard.149 Instead, the official would have to possess specific and 
articulable facts linking the speech to the danger sought to be 
avoided.150 Although this standard would strengthen the nexus 
required to issue a gag order, it is far from impossible to meet.151 An 
official would not need overwhelming evidence or even a 
preponderance of evidence. Instead, the official would need some 
specific facts, ensuring that the government did not make the decision 
to institute the gag order arbitrarily or speculatively, and the facts 
would need to give the official a reason to believe the harm would 
occur, ensuring a lower threshold of credibility for the nexus between 
the facts and the harm. 
C. The Court Must Narrowly Tailor the Gag Order to Minimize the 
Restraint 
The gag order must be narrowly tailored to last only as long as 
necessary and to preclude only the necessary speech. In aptly 
identifying the overbreadth of the nondisclosure provision, the Doe 
III court observed that 
an NSL recipient cannot communicate to anyone indefinitely that it 
received an NSL, the identity of the target, the type of information 
that was requested and/or provided, general statistical information 
such as the number of NSLs it received in the previous month or 
year, its opinion as to whether a particular NSL was properly issued 
 
 148. Id. at 1203. 
 149. See, e.g., City of Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Publ’g, 486 U.S. 750, 769 (1988) (“[N]othing 
in the law as written requires the mayor to do more than make the statement ‘it is not in the 
public interest’ when denying a permit application.”). 
 150. There is a very real possibility that disclosing the specific and articulable facts 
themselves might jeopardize national security or the government’s investigation, but the facts 
would at least exist in a documented form for a judge to review in camera if necessary. 
 151. See Edgar & Walczak, supra note 138, at 22 (“Historically, judges rarely refuse warrant 
requests.”). 
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in accordance with the applicable criteria, or perhaps even its 
opinion about the use of NSLs generally.152 
This passage reveals two concerns at work: the indefinite time period 
and the broad subject matter of the gag orders. This Section first 
addresses the temporal component and then turns to the subject-
matter component. 
The Doe III court made clear that a permanent prohibition on 
disclosure is unacceptable under the First Amendment: “[I]t is hard 
to conceive of any circumstances that would justify a permanent bar 
on disclosure.”153 Not only is a permanent bar on disclosure 
unconstitutional, but extending the prohibition longer than necessary 
to protect the national security interest is also unconstitutional: “[The 
one year moratorium on rechallenging the gag order] is not narrowly 
tailored because it may call for the period of nondisclosure to extend 
substantially beyond the time that national security necessitates.”154 
Therefore, the issuing authority and then the court must craft a gag 
order that only lasts as long as necessary to protect the government’s 
asserted interest. Such an order could also include automatic 
termination provisions if the suspect is apprehended, killed, or 
exonerated, for example. If Congress adapts the “specific and 
articulable” standard,155 the court could consider the government’s 
specific facts when determining the length of the gag order. 
In addition to narrowly tailoring the duration of the gag order, a 
court should also tailor the content of the gag order when possible. 
Although the Doe III court did not directly address this issue, it 
seems reasonable that the most narrowly tailored nondisclosure 
provisions should allow the recipient as much speech as possible given 
the government’s concerns about the effect of disclosure.156 
 
 152. Doe v. Gonzales (Doe III), 500 F. Supp. 2d 379, 420 (S.D.N.Y. 2007). 
 153. Id. at 421. 
 154. Id. at 422. 
 155. See supra Part III.B. 
 156. See Edgar & Walczak, supra note 138, at 28 (“While narrowly-tailored authority for the 
government to prevent disclosure of information that would truly affect national security is 
warranted, Congress should require that such authority be subject to judicial approval on a case-
by-case basis.”); Peter P. Swire, The System of Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Law, 72 GEO. 
WASH. L. REV. 1306, 1360 (2004) (“[D]isclosure might be permitted where the record holder 
reasonably believes that the disclosure would not reveal information detailed enough to 
materially assist the targets of an investigation.”). In their articles surveying the national 
security law landscape, Edgar, Walczak, and Professor Swire briefly mention tailoring the scope 
of NSL gag orders. This Note expands on their suggestions. 
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Gag orders could affect a range of the recipient’s speech 
interests, from identifying the target of a secret investigation to 
offering a general opinion about NSLs. A narrowly tailored 
nondisclosure provision should recognize and react to the differences 
between the speech interests along this spectrum.157 For example, if 
disclosing the identity of the target of the investigation would 
interfere with the investigation, but acknowledging that the recipient 
electronic communications service provider had received at least one 
NSL during the past year would not, the gag order should account for 
that difference whenever possible.158 One can imagine this approach 
working fairly well when the recipient is an officer of a large 
communications company that functions as an electronic 
communications service provider with a significant customer base.159 If 
the officer reveals the receipt of an NSL, the service provider would 
likely have too many customers for the target of the investigation to 
recognize the situation. Accordingly, the gag order for NSLs sent to 
that officer should reflect this reality and perhaps allow the officer to 
disclose annual statistics about the number of NSLs received in a 
yearly summary, to discuss thoughts about the efficacy of the NSL 
program, or to share impressions on the propriety of the NSLs being 
issued.160 
By requiring narrow tailoring of gag orders to minimize the 
duration of the gag order and the content covered, Congress could 
properly balance the competing interests of freedom of expression 
 
 157. One might properly identify this as a content-based restriction on speech. The Doe III 
court correctly noted, however, that a complete ban on speech is already a content-based 
restriction. See Doe III, 500 F. Supp. 2d at 397 (“[T]he amended § 2709(c) continues to act as a 
content-based restriction on speech. . . . [A]lthough . . . neutral with respect to viewpoint, it 
nonetheless functioned as a content-based restriction because it closed off an ‘entire topic’ from 
public discourse.” (quoting Doe v. Ashcroft (Doe I), 334 F. Supp. 2d 471, 513 (S.D.N.Y. 2004), 
vacated, 449 F.3d 415 (2d Cir. 2006))). If one accepts that under some circumstances a gag order 
can ban all speech about an NSL, then modifying that same gag order to ban only some speech 
about an NSL should not be a problem. 
 158. See Swire, supra note 156, at 1360 (“There could be rules about the scope of disclosure, 
with permission perhaps to report the mere existence of a request without authorization to 
disclose the nature of the request.”). 
 159. This hypothetical corporate officer could be the recipient of an Electronic 
Communications Privacy Act NSL under 18 U.S.C. § 2709 (2006). 
 160. Content tailoring becomes more difficult when the number of potential targets 
decreases. If the recipient is instead the operator of a very small local communications network 
with one hundred customers, the gag order may have to be adjusted to only permit disclosure 
anonymously or to only permit discussion of the operator’s general impressions of the NSL 
program as a citizen, not as a recipient. 
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and national security and ensure that one is not sacrificed for the 
other. 
CONCLUSION 
NSL nondisclosure provisions, even in light of the 2006 
amendments and in the wake of the Doe III decision, 
unconstitutionally prohibit recipients from exercising their First 
Amendment right to participate in the public debate about NSLs. In 
particular, the provisions fail three key First Amendment 
requirements. First, they restrain speech without providing the proper 
procedural safeguards to ensure prompt judicial review by forcing the 
recipient to shoulder the burden of seeking review and by imposing a 
very deferential standard of review. Second, the provisions vest too 
much discretion with the issuing authority by only requiring the issuer 
to certify that disclosure “may result [in] a danger to the national 
security of the United States.”161 Third, the provisions authorize gag 
orders that are not narrowly tailored to the harm sought to be 
prevented because they permit gag orders that both outlast the threat 
to national security and restrict a broader range of speech than 
necessary. 
This Note proposes a three-part solution that would create 
constitutional NSL nondisclosure provisions. First, the issuing 
authority should be permitted to issue a short, temporary gag order 
that expires unless the issuer goes to court and shoulders the burden 
of proof to seek judicial authorization. The recipient would still be 
able to challenge the gag order during this initial period. This 
component would address the Freedman deficiency and ensure that 
all NSLs receive prompt judicial review. Second, the issuing authority 
should be required to possess specific and articulable facts that give 
reason to believe that disclosure of the NSL would endanger national 
security, interfere with an investigation, or cause one of the other 
harms listed in the nondisclosure provisions. This requirement would 
hold the issuing authority to a higher standard and prevent the 
government from imposing gag orders under the broad umbrella of 
national security. Finally, gag orders should be tailored to only 
prohibit disclosure of NSL-related information that would actually 
lead to one of the harms listed in the nondisclosure provisions. Such 
 
 161. 18 U.S.C. § 2709(c)(1) (emphasis added). 
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tailoring would prevent gag orders both from lasting longer than 
necessary and from completely barring the recipient from the public 
debate about NSLs. 
This three-part solution addresses the constitutional deficiencies 
in NSL nondisclosure provisions while also ensuring that the 
government has the necessary tools available to combat terrorism. 
Although the first component shifts the burden of obtaining review to 
the government, it also permits the government to quickly respond to 
new threats by including a grace period before requiring judicial 
authorization. The second component raises the gag order threshold 
from mere conjecture and blanket statements to specific and concrete 
facts but still allows the government leeway to issue gag orders when 
it can articulate that need. The third component permits gag orders 
that protect investigations but requires the government to tailor those 
orders to only minimally invade the constitutional rights of its 
citizens. 
This delicate balancing reflects the careful analysis often 
required when the government attempts to curtail a civil liberty in the 
interest of national security. The anonymous author quoted at the 
beginning of this Note observed, 
I recognize that there may sometimes be a need for secrecy in 
certain national security investigations. But I’ve now been under a 
broad gag order for three years, and other NSL recipients have been 
silenced for even longer. At some point—a point we passed long 
ago—the secrecy itself becomes a threat to our democracy.162 
On the one hand, a nation must provide security to protect its 
citizens’ hard-fought liberties; on the other hand, without preserving 
those hard-fought liberties, a nation is not worth protecting. 
 
 
 162. Anonymous, supra note 1. 
